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Action recognition has received enormous interest in the field of neuroscience over the last two decades. In
spite of this interest, the knowledge in terms of fundamental neural mechanisms that provide constraints for
underlying computations remains rather limited. This fact stands in contrast with awide variety of speculative
theories about how action recognition might work. This review focuses on new fundamental electrophysio-
logical results in monkeys, which provide constraints for the detailed underlying computations. In addition,
we review models for action recognition and processing that have concrete mathematical implementations,
as opposed to conceptual models. We think that only such implemented models can be meaningfully linked
quantitatively to physiological data and have a potential to narrow down the many possible computational
explanations for action recognition. In addition, only concrete implementations allow judging whether postu-
lated computational concepts have a feasible implementation in terms of realistic neural circuits.Introduction
Action recognition and its relationship to other cognitive func-
tions have been one of the core topics in cognitive neuroscience
over the last decade (Keysers, 2011; Keysers and Perrett, 2004;
Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Schu¨tz-Bos-
bach and Prinz, 2007). The discovery of mirror neurons in the
premotor cortex of the monkey (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti
et al., 1996) has initiated awide interest in the neuroscience com-
munity for action processing and understanding, with implica-
tions in many other disciplines of neuroscience, including social
neuroscience, motor control, body- and self-representation,
body motion perception, and emotion processing. At the same
time, action processing and understanding in biological systems
have become topics of high interest in other disciplines outside
neuroscience. This includes, for example, computer vision, ro-
botics (e.g., Demiris and Hayes, 2002; Schaal et al., 2003), and
philosophy (e.g., Petit, 1999; Sinigaglia, 2013). In spite of the
outstanding interest for this topic, the number of publications
on the electrophysiological basis of action recognition that pro-
vide precise constraints for the underlying neural and computa-
tional mechanisms is still rather limited (compare, e.g., Kilner and
Lemon, 2013).
This lack of strongly constraining data, combinedwith the vivid
interest in the problem of action recognition and understanding,
motivated the development of a broad spectrum of partly ex-
tremely speculative theoretical accounts of action processing.
Many of these theories have never been concretely implemented
and have served only as frameworks for conceptual discussions.
However, considering the complexity of the underlying neural
and dynamical processes and the high dimensionality of the un-
derlying visual and motor patterns, the establishment of valid
theories without the help of concretely implemented models isvery difficult. Likewise, it is almost impossible to falsify such con-
ceptual accounts by comparing them with specific experimental
results in a conclusive manner.
Action-selective neurons are found in a number of brain struc-
tures, including the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the parietal,
the premotor, and the motor cortex. We will briefly review here
mainly the recent relevant results, focusing especially on a
number of novel studies on mirror neurons. Much more detailed
information about previous studies and other action-selective
neurons without mirror properties can be found in other reviews
(Nelissen et al., 2011; Puce and Perrett, 2003; Rizzolatti and Fo-
gassi, 2014; Rizzolatti et al., 2001).
Early studies on mirror neurons (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti
et al., 1996) reported that the responses of some mirror neurons
to visual stimulus might depend on specific characteristics and
modalities of the visual stimulation. However, only recent neuro-
physiological studies have studied these aspects systematically.
They have investigated how spatial parameters of observed ac-
tions influence the activity of mirror neurons, including the dis-
tance of the action from the observer as well as the perspective
or stimulus view, i.e., fromwhich direction the action is observed.
Moreover, these studies show that the mirror neuron discharge
intensity is influenced by the value that is associated with objects
on which the action is performed. We think that such parametri-
cally well-controlled studies of the different aspects that influ-
ence the activity of action-selective neurons, and especially of
mirror neurons, are absolutely essential for the development of
solid computational theories of action perception in the primate
cortex. In addition, the work of Lemon and his co-workers (see
Kraskov et al., 2014) showed that the mirror mechanism is not
limited to parieto-frontal circuit but also includes pyramidal tract
neurons originating from areas F5 and F1 (primary motor cortex).Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 167
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logically relevant neuro-computational mechanisms of action
recognition, we also provide an overview of the existing compu-
tational and neural models that are implemented in a sufficiently
concrete manner to allow meaningful comparisons with such
experimental data.
This overview of the existing work reveals several gaps in
terms of critical experiments that might help to decide between
different computational accounts, as well as between the avail-
able theoretical frameworks, all of which fail to capture some
essential properties of the neural data.We hope that this analysis
will help to set the goals for future research in experimental as
well as in theoretical neuroscience.
Preliminary Remark: Different Classes of Actions
Before reviewing neurophysiological data on action recognition
and discussing related models, it is important to stress that ac-
tions made by other individuals fall into two main categories.
One category is constituted by actions that are present in the
motor repertoire of the observers, and the other by actions that
are extraneous to their motor abilities. The processing of these
two different classes of actions involves partially different neural
substrates. Both categories of actions activate visual action-se-
lective areas located in the superior temporal sulcus (STS), while
they differ with respect to the involvement of motor structures.
To give an example, the observation of biting done by a dog, a
monkey, or a human being activates the same cortical parieto-
frontal network in human observers. In contrast, the observation
of a dog that barks activates visual but not motor areas (Buccino
et al., 2004).
A psychological explanation of these findings has been pro-
posed by Jeannerod. He suggested that ‘‘mere visual percep-
tion, without involvement of the motor system, would only pro-
vide a description of the visible aspects of the movements of
the agent, but it would not give precise information about the
intrinsic components of the observed action, which are critical
for understanding what the action is about, what is its goal, and
how to reproduce it.’’ This implies that perception of actions
without motor involvement is in some sense incomplete. Others
have interpreted the motor activation triggered by others’ ac-
tions in a more mechanistic way, suggesting that the motor
activation of the parieto-frontal network results in a ‘‘direct
recognition’’ of the observed action through the similarity be-
tween the observed and the executed action, not requiring
additional complex inference processes (direct matching hy-
pothesis) (Rizzolatti et al., 2014). A more recent interpretation
is that motor activation during action observation represents
a prediction triggered by the observed stimuli, which is neces-
sary to disambiguate the sensory representations emerging
during action observation (Kilner et al., 2007; Kilner, 2011; Wil-
son and Knoblich, 2005). Conceptually, this view minimizes, in
part, the role of motor system in action processing, while
stressing instead interactions between visual and motor areas
for action understanding.
Another important distinction from a theoretical point of view is
the one between transitive actions, which are directed toward
goal objects, and non-transitive ones without such goal objects.
It turns out (see ‘Example-based visual recognition models’) that168 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.the processing of transitive actions is computationally more diffi-
cult. It requires not only the recognition of the effector movement
(e.g., the moving hand) but also a processing of the relationship
between the effector and the goal object (e.g., whether hand and
object match spatially, or if the correct type of grip is applied
to a specific object). This necessitates additional computational
mechanisms that relate the movements of the effector to the
properties of goal objects (e.g., Oztop et al., 2004).
Electrophysiological Results
Due to space limitations, the following review of electrophysio-
logical results focuses on a few recently established novel as-
pects of mirror neurons, and properties of action-selective neu-
rons that likely provide input to the classical mirror neurons
system. An overview of the anatomy of the action observation
system is given in Figure 1. With respect to a more elaborate
treatment of previous results on the mirror neuron and action
processing system, we refer to several previous reviews (Puce
and Perrett, 2003; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti
and Fogassi, 2014).
Basic Motor Properties of Canonical andMirror Neurons
Area F5 contains twomain types of neurons responding to visual
stimuli: canonical neurons and mirror neurons. Canonical neu-
rons are neurons that respond to the presentation of three-
dimensional objects. Typically, there is congruence between
the size of the objects that trigger the neuron and the type of
grip encoded by that neuron (Murata et al., 1997). More recently,
Fluet et al. (2010) recorded canonical neuron activity inmonkeys,
instructed by an external context cue to grasp a handle with a
precision grip or a power grip. In addition, object orientation
was varied. The neurons showed a context-dependent grasp
planning activity after cue presentation and a motor grasp-
related activity during movement execution.
Contrasting with this class of neurons, mirror neurons are a
specific set of neurons originally described in area F5 in the pre-
motor cortex of the monkey. As all other types of neurons in area
F5, mirror neurons discharge during goal-directed actions such
as grasping, holding, and placing. Their main characteristic is
that they respond to the observation of actions done by others.
This property differentiates them not only from mere motor neu-
rons, but also from canonical neurons. The relative proportion of
these neuron types was investigated in a recent study in which a
large number of neurons of F5 were recorded using multi-elec-
trode linear arrays. The study reported that out of 479 recorded
grasping neurons, 221 were purely motor neurons, 197 were
mirror neurons, including 60 that also responded to object pre-
sentation, and, finally, 46 were canonical neurons (Bonini et al.,
2014).
Mirror neurons are also present in monkey parietal areas con-
nected with area F5 (see below). Their properties appear to be
similar to those of mirror neurons in area F5. However, detailed
comparative studies that assess possible differences between
the functional properties of parietal and premotor mirror neurons
have still to be undertaken.
In humans, mirror neurons were recorded in mesial motor
areas and the hippocampus (Mukamel et al., 2010). The record-
ings were made in surgical patients with drug-resistant epilepsy.
The type of electrodes used (large linear electrodes with low
Figure 1. Action Observation Network
(A) Lateral view of a macaque brain showing the locations of three region (STS,
Intraparietal sulcus region- IPS, Inferior arcuate sulcus region- IAS) involved in
action observation.
(B) Flattened representation of STS, IPS, and IAS. FEF (frontal eye fields). Vi-
sual information on observed actions is sent from STS through parietal cortex
to area F5 along two functional routes indicated with red and blue arrows,
respectively. Area 45B receives parietal input from LIP and also has direct
connections with the lower bank of STS (green arrows). For further abbrevia-
tions, see text. (Modified from Nelissen et al. [2011].)
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electrode end for single neuron recording) biased, inevitably,
the single neurons database toward the medial part of the brain.
A large body of evidence (including EEG and MEG, TMS, and
brain-imaging experiments) shows, however, that human parie-
tal and premotor areas became active during action observation
(see Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014). These areas closely corre-
spond to those active in the monkey during action observation
in fMRI experiments (Nelissen et al., 2011). These are also the
areas where mirror neurons were recorded. Thus, there is little
doubt that the action execution/action observation circuit of hu-
mans houses mirror neurons.
SomeNewly Established Properties ofMirror Neurons in
Area F5
(1) Influence of the Observed Action Location Relative to the
Observer. Early studies of mirror neurons were focused on
demonstrating congruence betweenmotor and visual responses
of the recorded neurons (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al.,
1996). In those studies it was already reported, however, that
mirror neurons form different subcategories according to the vi-
sual stimuli that are most effective in triggering them, and not all
of them showed strong congruency between visual and motor
tuning.
Different aspects of the visual-tuning properties of mirror
neurons were addressed in the last few years. One of these as-
pects was how the spatial location of the observed actions in-fluences how mirror neurons discharge (Caggiano et al., 2009).
The results showed that the response of about half of the mirror
neurons of area F5 discharged differently according to the loca-
tion in space of the observed motor acts. Half of them dis-
charged more strongly or exclusively to stimuli presented
in the monkey peripersonal space; half preferred the extraper-
sonal space.
In the same study, it was investigatedwhether space-selective
neurons encode space in a ‘‘metric’’ or in an ‘‘operational’’
format. ‘‘Metric format’’ indicates that the location of effective
stimuli was defined in terms of the true geometrical position or
distance from the monkey. In contrast, space encoding in an
‘‘operational format’’ refers to the fact that the effective stimulus
location is dependent on the possibility of themonkey interacting
with the objects and not on the true physical distance between
the monkey and observed action. The experiment by Caggiano
et al. (2009) showed that about half of the tested space-selective
mirror neurons were ‘‘operational mirror neurons,’’ while the
other half encoded the space in a metric way (‘‘Cartesian mirror
neurons’’).
To our knowledge, no computational or neural models exist
that would capture these observed transformations of spatial
tuning properties dependent on the operational space of the
monkey.
(2) Modulation of Mirror Neuron Responses by the Perspective
View of Observed Actions. A very interesting recently investi-
gated issue was whether mirror neurons provide information
concerning the perspective from which the motor acts of others
are observed (Caggiano et al., 2011). Three perspectives were
tested: subjective view (0), side view (90), and frontal view
(180). The results showed that most tested mirror neurons
(74%) were view-dependent, their responses being tuned either
to one or, more frequently, to two specific points of view. Only a
minority of the study’s neurons (26%) exhibited view-indepen-
dent responses; that is, their response did not vary significantly
with the perspective.
The observation of view dependence fits nicely with example-
based visual recognition mechanisms (see the section entitled
Theoretical Models). However, it has to be noted that the same
population of neurons can be simultaneously tuned to multiple
parameters, e.g., to the view and different grip types. In addition,
individual neurons can show different degrees of invariance with
respect to these parameters (see also Singer and Sheinberg,
2010). This type of multi-dimensional tuning is not captured by
most existing theoretical models, which typically make the
simplifying assumption that individual modules encode only a
specific set of parameters instead of mixingmany apparently un-
related computational functions.
There are two further issues that deserve some discussion
here. The first is the origin of the input that may determine the
properties of view-dependent and view- independent F5 mirror
neurons. The second is whatmight be the functional role of these
two types of mirror neurons. Themain input to F5 arises from pa-
rietal areas PFG and AIP (antero interpatietal area) (see Figure 1).
However, there is no detailed information available about the
properties of these neurons in terms of their view-dependence
properties. PFG and AIP receive input from various areas located
in the superior temporal sulcus region. In this region, neuronsNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 169
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been described before (Perrett et al., 1985).
A common explanation for the computational function of view-
tuned neuros in the visual pathway is that they represent an inter-
mediate step toward view-invariant representations (e.g., Perrett
and Oram, 1993). View-invariant neurons might pool the re-
sponses from view-variant ones with selectivity for different
views. However, given that mirror neurons by definition have
well-defined motor-tuning properties, and thus are motor neu-
rons, this explanation captures only a part of their possible
computational role. It seems likely that such neurons combine in-
formation about the visual perspective of perceived actions with
associated motor behavior.
An interesting possibility is that view-dependent mirror neu-
rons might be helpful within an architecture that combines for-
ward and backward streams of information processing, in order
to support feedback from motor representations to purely visual
areas, e.g., via parietal cortex. Such modulation of bottom-up
processing by an interpretation on more abstract levels higher
up in the processing hierarchy has been repeatedly conceptual-
ized, e.g., in the context of reverse-hierarchy theory by (Ahissar
and Hochstein, 2004) several years ago. Likewise, this idea
forms a central element in theories in computer vision (Ullman,
1996) and plays a central role in predictive coding theories on ac-
tion recognition (see section entitled, Bayesian Models). More
empirical data are needed, however, to confirm this appealing
hypothesis.
(3) Mirror Neurons Are Sensitive for the Value of an Observed
Action. It was originally suggested that mirror neurons describe
exclusively the goal of the observed action and that their
discharge is not influenced by the properties of the objects on
which the action is performed or by the value that this object
may have for the monkey. A series of recent findings indicate
that is not always true. In fact, a set of mirror neuron in area F5
has been observed whose discharge was modulated by the
value that the grasped object had for the monkey (Caggiano
et al., 2012). Two experiments demonstrated this point.
In the first, the discharge of mirror neurons during the obser-
vation of an agent, who was grasping food, was contrasted
with that of the same agent grasping objects devoid of any
meaning and value for the monkey. It was found that the large
majority of tested neurons were more strongly activated in the
‘‘food’’ condition. In the second experiment, the responses of
mirror neurons were studied in response to the observation of
an agent grasping the same objects, which were either asso-
ciated with a reward given to the monkey or were not re-
warded. About 50% of the tested neurons responded more
strongly when the observed motor acts were performed on re-
warded objects, while a small percentage showed a stronger
response for non-rewarded objects. Finally, the discharge
of about 40% of neurons was not influenced by the reward
conditions.
At first glance, the influence of the object value on mirror
neuron responses is rather surprising. However, there is evi-
dence (see below) that one of the nodes of themirror system (pa-
rietal area AIP) receives information not only from the lower bank
of the STS, but also from the inferotemporal lobe, a region that
likely encodes the semantics of objects. Furthermore, neurons170 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.in both orbitofrontal cortex and cingulate sulcus are more
strongly activated when the monkey anticipates a larger reward
(Maunsell, 2004; Roesch and Olson, 2003, 2007). It is likely that
areas that associate object and reward determine the value-
related responses of mirror neurons through their output to the
premotor areas.
This again demonstrates that cortical levels of processing
cannot be easily mapped onto distinct computational steps,
like action recognition, motor planning, or the decision between
different alternative motor programs. Present theoretical frame-
works do not provide a systematic approach to deal with such
fuzzy assignments of computational functions to anatomical
levels.
Action Observation Circuit: The Input to the Premotor
Cortex
The functional properties of STS neurons strongly suggest that
these neurons provide the fundamental cortical visual input to
mirror neurons. This hypothesis was recently confirmed byNelis-
sen et al. (2011) using fMRI techniques, complemented by
neuroanatomical tracing. Monkeys were presented with different
types of hand grasping actions. Activations were found in three
cortical regions: STS, inferior parietal lobule, and the premotor
region. A subsequent analysis, carried out using as region of
interest (ROI) the parietal cytoarchitectonically defined areas
PF, PFG, PG, and AIP, showed activation only in areas PFG
and AIP. No action-specific activation was found in the other pa-
rietal areas. A subsequent connectivity study showed that the
two parietal ‘‘mirror’’ areas are linked with different sectors of
STS. Area PFG is connected with the upper bank of STS, and
in particular with area STPm. In contrast, AIP is mostly con-
nected with the lower bank of STS, and in particular with its
most rostral subdivisions (see Figure 1). Note that the temporal
input to AIP originates not only from STS lower bank, but also
from cortex that is part the inferotemporal lobe. These finding
is of great interest because it indicates that the mirror network
has access to information concerning object semantics. Such
semantics defines, for example, classes of objects that are asso-
ciated with the same type of grip.
Unlike mirror neurons, the neurons in the STS do not have mo-
tor properties, but they respond to visual action stimuli (Oram
and Perrett, 1996; Perrett et al., 1989). Recent studies on the
neural encoding of observed actions in the STS showed that
this area contains many view-dependent neurons (Barraclough
et al., 2009; Vangeneugden et al., 2011). This seems consistent
with the idea that the view dependence in mirror neurons might
result from their afferent visual inputs. Finally, many STS neurons
show temporal sequence selectivity and seem to associate the
information of stimulus patterns over time (Barraclough et al.,
2009; Singer and Sheinberg, 2010; Vangeneugden et al.,
2011). Some of these neurons show tuning for actor identity
(Singer and Sheinberg, 2010). In addition, the similarity of the
neural activation patterns of STS neurons match closely the
physical similarity between the encoded action patterns (Vange-
neugden et al., 2009). STS neurons encode thusmany aspects of
actions regardless of whether those actions belong to the
observer motor repertoire. They do not show, however, the
motor properties that characterize premotor and parietal mirror
neurons.
Neuron
PerspectiveAction Observation Circuit: The Mirror Output form the
Premotor Cortex
It is well known (Dum and Strick, 1991) that the hand representa-
tion of the primary motor cortex (areas M1 or F1) receives a
strong input from area F5. However, early studies testing the
mirror properties of neurons located in area F1 yielded negative
results (Gallese et al., 1996). Recently, in a series of experiments
on the mirror properties of the cortico-spinal tract neurons (Kras-
kov et al., 2009; Vigneswaran et al., 2013) demonstrated that
many of these neurons respond to the observation of actions
done by others.
A first study examined the activity of cortico-spinal neurons
originating from area F5. They found that the discharge of about
half of the tested neurons was modulated by grasping observa-
tion. Interestingly, the discharge rates of about 25% of these
neurons were not increased, but rather suppressed during
observation (Kraskov et al., 2009).
A second study investigated the responses of cortico-spinal
neurons originating from area F1 (Vigneswaran et al., 2013).
About half of the tested neurons were modulated by action
observation. Among these neurons, most increased their
discharge rates during observation, while others reduced their
discharge rates, or even stopped firing. A comparison between
the properties of cortico-spinal F1 and F5 mirror neurons
showed that the visual responses in F1 were much weaker
than in F5. Thus, although many cortico-spinal F1 neurons fire
during action observation, their input to spinal circuitry is weak
and insufficient to produce movement.
These data are of great importance because they indicate that
the understanding of goals ofmotor behaviormight not be simply
a function of F5 mirror neurons, but rather is based on complex
motor representations that involve even cortico-spinal tract neu-
rons. This again indicates the weakness of the classical concep-
tualization of strictly hierarchical processing, here in terms of a
separation between motor programming (in premotor cortex)
and processes of motor control that are associated with area
F1 and the cortico-spinal tract.
Theoretical Models with Explicit Mathematical
Implementations
While a wide spectrum of conceptual models for action process-
ing exists, we focus here only on models with explicit mathemat-
ical implementations since we think that they will be most useful
for narrowing down underlying computational mechanisms. In
addition, space constraints do not allow us to extend the discus-
sion to several interesting aspects that have been extensively
discussed in the context of conceptual models. This includes
(1) the relationship between action processing, mirror neurons,
and the representation of language (Arbib, 2005; Pulvermu¨ller,
2005; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998); (2) the issue of howmirror neu-
rons emerge in terms of learning and evolution (Cook et al., 2014;
Keysers and Perrett, 2004); (3) the relationship between action
processing and social cognition (Gallese et al., 2004; Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2008; Spaulding, 2013); (4) philosophical as-
pects, such as how mirror neurons are related to mind reading
(Keysers and Gazzola, 2007), the awareness of self and others,
or empathy (e.g., Oberman and Ramachandran, 2007; Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2008). While such aspects are of broad generalinterest, the presently available neural data seem not sufficient
to constrain mathematically implemented computational models
on these aspects.
Before starting our review of existing models, it seems impor-
tant to discuss briefly the role of models in neuroscience and,
specifically, in the field of action recognition. There exists a het-
erogeneous spectrum of understanding about the function of
theories in cognitive neuroscience, which ranges from quantita-
tive, exactly defined mathematical models (e.g., for biophysical
processes in neurons, or about relationships between psycho-
physical variables that can be accurately measured) up to
conceptual post hoc discussions and box-and-arrow models,
summing up speculative claims with relevance for subsets of
data. Since in action recognition a vast number of speculative
explanations already exist, we think that this field might profit
more from theory concept that is similar to the one in physics.
According to this, a theory should link quantitatively different
variables, for which one can specify an exact method how
they are measured. This seems not to apply to a variety of pop-
ular concepts in the field of action perception (such as ‘‘inten-
tion,’’ ‘‘empathy,’’ ‘‘mind,’’ etc.), and for this reason we do not
discuss them in this paper. The quantitative link to data might
be made at different levels, e.g., at a behavioral level or even
by explaining or predicting the behavior of individual neurons.
Phenomenological models that relate different behavioral vari-
ables are important and often help to delineate fundamental
computational problems and principles. Yet, they usually do
not uniquely specify the neural mechanisms that implement
such computations. For this, more detailed models, including
details about the processing in neurons or neuron populations,
are required. In addition, it is possible that certain computations
cannot be efficiently implemented with real neurons. It is
thus a nontrivial step to claim that a computationally efficient
algorithm, e.g., in computer vision, really has relevance for the
brain. For this, at least at some point, one has to show how
the postulated computations can be implemented by neurons
with biophysically plausible properties, and it has to be verified
if the resulting predicted behavior of neurons matches electro-
physiological data. This conception of different levels of theory
in neuroscience matches the classical distinction of levels of
analysis that has been proposed by Marr (1982) for computa-
tional vision.
The existing theoretical approaches in the focus of this review
fall in three main categories. The first tries to implement the
‘‘direct matching hypothesis’’ (Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014; Riz-
zolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010), thus the hypothesis that action
recognition and understanding exploits motor representations
of the observed action (see above).
The second category tries to explain action recognition and
understanding using predictive Bayesian models, assuming an
interplay of sensory representations and their validation via
top-down predictions from higher-level representations that
encode underlying causes or motor states, including action
goals.
The third class of approaches consists of visual pattern recog-
nition models that accomplish action recognition by the identifi-
cation of visual feature sequences, without making reference to
the motor system. These approaches account for visual actionNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 171
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and motor execution.
We try to focus here mainly on novel approaches and refer to
classical models only to the degree that is necessary to under-
stand the conceptual basis of the more recent approaches.
Classical Models Based on Artificial Neural Networks
The first implemented models for action processing and mirror
systems were based on artificial neural networks. These models
are important, since they demonstrated that computational
problems related to action processing and the mirror neuron
system could be implemented and solved mathematically. How-
ever, these models typically do not claim that the proposed im-
plementations reproduce detailed properties of cortical neurons.
This puts these approaches between conceptual models and
models that reproduce details of the physiology of the action
processing system.
Among the first and most influential work using artificial neural
networks are the seminal models by Arbib and coworkers (Bo-
naiuto et al., 2007; Oztop and Arbib, 2002). Using architectures
that are coarsely inspired by the connectivity between the
different parts of the action processing network (e.g., the STS,
parietal areas such as AIP or IPS [intraparietal sulcus], or LIP
[lateral intraparietal cortex], premotor areas such as F5, and pri-
mary motor cortex), and implementing individual computational
modules using classical neural network techniques (including
back-propagation), these models accomplish the recognition
of grips and trajectory prediction. Action recognition is accom-
plished by the learning of mappings between visual features
and features characterizing the goal object and its affordances
(i.e., the way how it has to be manipulated), and between visual
features and hand states, that characterize the hand configura-
tion during grasping. The temporal sequence of hand states
can then be exploited to recognize the action. Newer versions
of the model include also an auditory pathway in order to model
the multimodality of mirror neurons (Kohler et al., 2002), and
account for the fact that mirror neurons respond during partially
occluded actions (Umilta` et al., 2001). In addition, these architec-
tures have been linked to controller models (Oztop et al., 2006),
and recently they have been extended by mechanism for moni-
toring of the possibility to execute actions and of the values of
their outcomes (Bonaiuto and Arbib, 2010). A similar theoretical
approach is also followed by models of other groups, such as
the TROPICAL model (Caligiore et al., 2010), which exploits a
variety of classical neural network techniques (including also
Kohonen maps, neural fields, and hierarchical object recognition
architectures) in order to model behavioral results on stimulus
response compatibility. Others have applied classical neural
network techniques to account for the problem of how different
action perspectives might be matched during the learning of
mirror neurons (Schrodt et al., 2014).
Models Based on Controller Architectures
Another class of classical models implementing the direct
matching hypothesis has been derived from controller architec-
tures that have been developed to account for motor control.
These behavioral models typically combine two types of dynam-
ical internal models that model parts of the sensorimotor loop
(Demiris and Khadhouri, 2006; Wolpert et al., 2003): (1) Forward
models that compute predictions for state changes of the motor172 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.system and associated sensory signals from the motor com-
mand, where it is assumed that the brain sends a copy of themo-
tor control signal as input to the forward model (reafference). (2)
Inverse models that map sensory signals directly to appropriate
control signals. This makes it possible to accomplish fast control
in situations where the signals for feedback control are too slow.
A prominent implementation of this approach is the MOSAIC ar-
chitecture (Haruno et al., 2001), which combines multiple con-
trollers for different behaviors (each consisting of a forward
and inverse model) that are operating in parallel within a mixture
of experts architecture (Figure 2A). The final control signal is
determined by weighting of the outputs of the expert controllers,
dependent on the sizes of their prediction errors with respect to
the available sensory signals. As consequence, the outputs of
the controllers that best predict the sensory inputs signals
have the highest weights. It has been postulated that the
MOSAIC model also explains the perception of actions and so-
cial behaviors, assuming that movements are classified by
determining the controller module that produces the smallest
prediction error (Wolpert et al., 2003). Controller-based models
have been embedded in hierarchical architectures with a
lower level that is formed by the expert controller modules for
different actions and a top level that controls their contribution,
allowing for the generation of action sequences (Haruno et al.,
2003).
Mirror neurons have been associated specifically with the im-
plementation of the forwardmodels in such control architectures
(Oztop et al., 2006), and the parietal cortex has been proposed
as being involved in the representation of the inversemodels (Mi-
all, 2003). In addition, it seems likely that subcortical structures,
such as the cerebellum, are involved in the implementation of the
relevant internal models (Caligiore et al., 2013).
Controller-based approaches have been very successful in
accounting for behavioral data and have motivated many behav-
ioral experiments. The way how such controllers are imple-
mented in terms of cortical and subcortical circuits is not entirely
clear. However, the idea of predictive control and of internal
models that predict sensory consequences is dominating the
present discussion about action encoding in cognitive neurosci-
ence. The same concepts are presently frequently discussed in
the context of predictive coding theories (see also Section
‘Bayesian Models’). Another important concept is the idea of hi-
erarchical representation of actions, which also has been postu-
lated on the basis of human imaging data (Grafton and Hamilton,
2007).
A computational problem is that controller models often as-
sume an internal simulation of motor programs in joint angle
space, without specifying how such motor-relevant variables
can be efficiently extracted from retinal image sequences. In ro-
botics this difficult computational vision problem is typically by-
passed by use of computer vision systems or special sensors
that are not biologically plausible. Another problem for models
that try to identify motor control policies from observation
(Schaal et al., 2003) is that the dynamics of observed actors often
does notmatch the one of the observer, for example because the
observer has a different body geometry or masses of the body
segments. This leads to a nontrivial correspondence problem,
where one has to find a mapping between the movements or
Figure 2. Examples of Models for the Visual
Recognition of Goal-Directed Actions that
Illustrate Different Theoretical Principles
(A) Model based on a motor control architecture,
such as the MOSAIC model. Different controllers
are responsible for the different actions, such
as walking and kicking. Forward models compute
the predicted sensory signals from the corre-
sponding motor commands. The control model
with the smallest prediction error in the sensory
domain determines the classified actions (‘‘kick-
ing’’) (modified from Wolpert et al., 2003).
(B) Example-based visual recognition model for
hand actions. The model consists of neural de-
tectors that mimic properties of cortical neurons. It
comprises three modules: (a) shape recognition
hierarchy that recognizes hand and object shapes;
(b) ‘‘affordance module’’ that analyzes the
matching between grip type and objects shape
and their spatial parameters; (c) recognition
module that consists of neurons that are selective
for goal-directed hand actions. View indepen-
dence is generated at the highest level of the
hierarchy by pooling the output signals from view-
specific modules (modified from Fleischer et al.,
2013).
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(Dautenhahn and Nehaniv, 2001).
Dynamic Recurrent Neural Networks and Neural Field
Models
Another class of action processing models with closer relation-
ships to brain functions is based on recurrent neural networks
and neural fields. Neural fields are space-continuous recurrent
neural network models that describe the dynamics of distributed
activation patterns in the nervous system. Opposed to large-
scale neural models with discrete neuron, they sometimes
permit a mathematical analysis and understanding of the
emerging neural activity patterns. Recently, such models are
also often discussed under the term ‘‘neural mass models’’
(e.g., Deco et al., 2011). They describe the dynamic variation of
the average activity of ensembles of cortical neurons with similar
tuning properties (mean-field approximation). This makes them
suitable to establish links to detailed mechanisms at the level
of real neuron ensembles. Neural fields have been used to ac-
count for action recognition and for mirror representations.
Influential models based on recurrent neural networks have
been proposed by Tani et al. (2004). The networks are trained
in a supervised manner with pairs of sensory and motor signals.
The trained networks can predict trajectories from incomplete
sensor information. This class of models has been extended to-
ward dynamic hierarchical representations, where the top level
represents the sequential order of actions, while the lower levels
represent the trajectories of the individual actions.More recently,
such models have been extended by inclusion of neuron pools
with multiple timescales, forming a hierarchy (Yamashita and
Tani, 2008). The models of the Tani group have been tested
extensively for movement generation and recognition in human-oid robots, showing that they scale up for complex real-world
problems. This shows the feasibility of action representation
with such recurrent network architectures. The developed net-
works are not aimingat reproducing detailed properties of cortical
neurons,while it appears thatbyappropriatemodificationof these
models this might be possible. By linking perceptual and motor
representations, such models address mirror representations.
A second class of biologically motivated dynamical network
models is based on dynamic neural fields (Amari, 1977; Wilson
and Cowan, 1972). Dynamic neural fields have been proposed
as physiologically inspiredmodels for the distributed representa-
tion of motor programs, as well as for the self-organization of
perceptual patterns, e.g., in low-level vision (Dayan and Abbott,
2001; Erlhagen and Scho¨ner, 2002; Giese, 1999). For appro-
priate choice of the lateral connectivity, neural fields can have
stable solutions that correspond to temporally propagating
localized activity pulses. Such propagating pulse solutions can
be used to model the sequential activation of neurons that
encode different motor states, or instances along a trajectory.
This mechanism has been proposed for the encoding of motor
programs as well as for the encoding of perceived visual pattern
sequences (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Giese and Poggio, 2003;
Zhang, 1996). Neural fields have also been used to account for
the interaction between movement recognition and action plan-
ning in robotics (Erlhagen et al., 2006; Sauser and Billard, 2006)
For example, the STS, and cortical areas PF and F5, have been
modeled by dynamically coupled neural fields with highly simpli-
fied inputs (Erlhagen et al., 2006). In addition, it was demon-
strated that the required coupling between such neural fields
can be learned with a Hebbian learning rule, providing a possible
implementation for the hypothesis that mirror circuits mightNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 173
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and Perrett, 2004).
Neural field models have been directly compared to neural
data in motor and premotor cortex (e.g., Cisek and Kalaska,
2010; Erlhagen et al., 1999). A major limitation of the discussed
neural fieldmodel formirror representations is that they use high-
ly simplified low-dimensional input and motor patterns. This
leaves open whether the proposed architectures, and the asso-
ciated nonlinear dynamics, scale up to perceptual and motor
patterns with realistic dimensionality. (See below for an applica-
tion of neural fields for action perception from real videos.)
Closely related to neural field models are models for ‘‘motor
chains’’ (Chersi et al., 2011). Thesemodels are directlymotivated
by electrophysiological experiments in premotor and parietal
cortex. They consist of ensembles of spiking neurons models
that encode different phases of actions (e.g., reaching, grasping,
and bringing to themouth), andwhich are dynamically coupled in
a way that results a sequential activation, representing the
sequential order of the temporal phases of the action. This
property reproduces the fact that neurons, e.g., in the premotor
cortex, are often tuned for individual grip phases and show
activation only during the relevant phase. It is assumed that
the ensembles receive input from motor as well as from visual
structures, and that the first ensemble is excited by an external
ensemble that encodes intention (potentially represented in the
prefrontal cortex). The activity of this external ensemble initiates
the sequential activation of the chain of ensembles. This mech-
anism is thus very similar to the propagation of a localized acti-
vation pulse in a neural field (see above). The intention ensemble
receives feedback input form the corresponding motor chain, re-
sulting in an activation of the corresponding intention represen-
tation when a motor behavior is observed or executed.
Chain models have a high degree of physiological plausibility
and are thus suitable for a detailed comparison with real neural
data. So far the models have been tested only with idealized
low-dimensional peak-shaped input signals, which leaves
open the question of whether such models and their dynamics
generalize to pattern spaces with realistic complexity.
Bayesian Models
Another extremely popular class of models is based on Bayesian
probabilistic inference. A first simple Bayesian model for action
classification has been proposed in the context of a robotics
system (Metta et al., 2006). It postulates that different parts of
the mirror neuron system correspond to the components of a
Bayesian action classifier and accomplishes classifications of
hand actions from video input, using a computer-vision input
model that is not biologically plausible.
Another very influential Bayesian action recognition model has
been proposed by Friston and colleagues (Friston et al., 2011;
Kilner et al., 2007), based on the idea of ‘‘predictive coding’’ (Fris-
ton, 2010). This models picks up a variety of principles from the
theories discussed before: (1) formulation of parts of the senso-
rimotor loop as predictive dynamical systems; (2) the minimiza-
tion of the prediction error in sensory space; (3) use of nonlinear
dynamical systems, and specifically of sequentially activated
chains of neurons (called ‘‘stable heteroclinic channels’’ in this
literature) for the encoding of the sequential time structure of ac-
tions; (4) dynamical hierarchies, specifying actions at different174 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.levels of abstraction, and with a bottom-up and top-down ex-
change of information. These elements are combined within a
brain theory, derived from machine learning and theoretical
physics, which postulates that circuits in the brain realize a spe-
cial form of belief-propagation algorithm. According to this inter-
pretation, the brain estimates hidden variables (including internal
dynamical states and intentions) based on sensory observations,
where it exploits a probabilistic hierarchical dynamical genera-
tive model in order to specify how the sensory signals depend
on external causes, and on the internal state variables of the
brain. The parameters and variables of this probabilistic model
are estimated using a Bayesian approach, combining prior distri-
butions for the estimated variables with likelihoods. The likeli-
hoods specify how the variables at individual hierarchy levels
are statistically related to prediction errors for the variables in
the next-lower level of the hierarchy. The likelihoods define
thus a bottom-up stream of information within the hierarchy. In
addition, it is assumed that the priors at the different levels are
estimated by top-down predictions from the next higher level
in the hierarchy (implementing a special form of ‘‘empirical
Bayes,’’ where prior distributions are also estimated by maxi-
mizing consistency of the model with the data). This defines
a top-down stream of information within the hierarchy. The
approach makes it in principle possible to estimate all model pa-
rameters by minimizing the prediction error (more precisely the
surprise or entropy) in the space of the sensory signals.
The underlying parameter estimation problem cannot be
solved exactly because it becomes intractable, even for rela-
tively low-dimensional problems (a frequent problem in Bayesian
inference). This problem can be circumvented by minimizing not
the real prediction error, but an upper bound that depends on it
(‘‘free energy’’). This bound is formulated using an approximative
distribution for the hidden variables that results in a tractable
problem (‘‘variational Bayesian inference’’). A key assumption
in the theory is that this approximative distribution is Gaussian
(which can be motivated by a ‘‘Laplace approximation’’ for the
underlying true distributions). With these assumptions, it is
possible to derive an algorithm that minimizes the free energy
bound by a gradient descent. The gradient descent algorithm
can be implemented as message passing procedure, where sig-
nals are exchanged within a network that consists of hierar-
chically connected ‘‘nodes.’’ The idea is that these nodes can
be mapped onto neurons or neuron ensembles. The proposed
message passing procedure specifies exactly which signals
are exchanged between the nodes and how these signals are
computed within the nodes (Friston, 2005).
It has been speculated that the mirror neuron system and ac-
tion perception might be understood within this framework (Kil-
ner et al., 2007). Action control and recognition using this idea
have been implemented for simple examples with a two-degree
of freedom arm (Friston et al., 2010, 2011). In addition, it has
been demonstrated (for artificial simulated birdsongs) that the
framework allows the learning of hierarchical models that repre-
sent dynamical signals atmultiple time scales (Kiebel et al., 2008,
2009).
The theory proposed by Friston clearly addresses mirror
mechanisms, since it specifies how sensory and motor repre-
sentations are interacting, and since intermediate levels of the
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speculative frameworks, the implemented versions of the free-
energy framework by Friston have the advantage that they
make precise predictions about the exchanged neural signals
and the computations in neurons ensembles that correspond
to individual nodes. Such predictions can be tested by compar-
ison with electrophysiological data. However, the detailed eval-
uation of such predictions is far from accomplished. Some as-
pects of the free energy framework are also common to many
other theories (e.g., hierarchy, asymmetry of bottom-up and
top-down connections, sequence encoding by neural state dy-
namics). Other aspects are more specific, and some predictions
about the signal flow across cortical layers seem tomatch obser-
vations in real neurons (Bastos et al., 2012). Other aspects seem
not to be in agreement with electrophysiological data, at least in
action selective neurons. An example is the prediction that
cortical neurons ensembles only encode unimodal distributions
(because of the necessity to assume Gaussian distributions for
the message passing algorithm) (Friston, 2008). A further issue
is that it is not clear if for realistically complex pattern spaces
the belief propagation iteration can be finished sufficiently fast
in order to account for the observed rather low neural latencies.
Action-selective neurons in area F5 can have latencies as short
as 60 ms (Maranesi et al., 2014), and the average latencies are
not much larger than 100 ms. This is not so much more than
the sum of the synaptic delays from the retina to these neurons,
leaving not much time for convergence of complex inference al-
gorithms or optimization schemes. It has been discussed that a
part of this convergence processes might happen during evolu-
tion. However, in order to go beyond speculation, it would be
important to implement the proposed theory for patterns with
realistic complexity and then to show that by pre-training one
can build a system that can realize the remaining inference steps
sufficiently fast. It remains thus an exciting and challenging topic
to verify if the predictions of predictive coding account are really
consistent with the properties of real cortical neurons.
Example-based Visual Recognition Models
A further class of action recognition models takes a completely
different approach from previously discussed theories, concep-
tualizing action recognition as a purely visual pattern recognition
process. Such approaches also account for action recognition in
cases where the observer is lacking motor representations of the
observed behavior (e.g., observation of a flying bird, or a dog
barking). These theories were motivated by learning-based ob-
ject recognitionmodels (see Tarr andBu¨lthoff, 1998) that accom-
plish invariant object recognition by learning example views.
Likewise, action recognition can be accomplished by learning
to recognize sequences of visual patterns that are derived from
retinal image sequences. The key for the efficiency of such sys-
tems is to accomplish invariance of the learned representations
against parameters that are not relevant for the recognition (e.g.,
position, view, unimportant kinematic details, etc.). Almost all
technical approaches for the robust visual detection and recog-
nition of actions in computer vision and robotics are based on the
learning of visual patterns (e.g., Moeslund et al., 2006), demon-
strating the feasibility of this approach for real-world problems.
Example-based physiologically inspired neural action recog-
nition models have first been proposed for the recognition ofnon-transitive actions without goal objects. The developed
models consist of hierarchies of feature detectors that mimic
the properties of neurons at different levels of the visual pathway,
from primary visual cortex, over intermediate levels such as area
V4, up to the STS (Giese and Poggio, 2003; Lange and Lappe,
2006). Invariance is accomplished by pooling the responses
from size-, position-, or view-specific detectors at higher levels
of the hierarchy (e.g., Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999). The
recognition of actions can be accomplished either by recog-
nizing sequences of body shapes, or by the recognition of se-
quences of associated optic flow patterns, where likely the brain
integrates both feature types in recognition. Neural fields, imple-
menting a predictive dynamics with a stable traveling pulse solu-
tion, have been proposed as physiologically plausible mecha-
nism for the recognition of feature sequences (Giese and
Poggio, 2003), next to other schemes for spatio-temporal inte-
gration. While such example-based hierarchical visual recogni-
tion models have been originally developed as models for
cortical processing, they have been extended to applications
in computer vision, achieving competitive performance with
state-of-the-art computer vision algorithms (Escobar and Korn-
probst, 2008; Jhuang et al., 2007; Schindler et al., 2008).
Very recently, computer vision has developed a strong interest
in such hierarchical neural network architectures, discussed un-
der the terms ‘‘deep learning architectures’’ or ‘‘convolutional
neural networks.’’ This interest was initiated by the fact that
such architectures outperformed other algorithms, first for ob-
ject recognition (LeCun et al., 2015), but later also for many other
computer vision problems including action classification (Karpa-
thy et al., 2014; Le et al., 2011). Such deep architectures are
presently among the best performing solutions for action classi-
fication from real videos in computer vision. Also, recently, deep
architectures including dynamical neurons that learn hierarchical
spatio-temporal representations have been proposed (Jung
et al., 2015). Many details of the existing deep architectures
(applied filter kernels, training schemes, regularization by ‘‘drop
out,’’ etc.) are not biologically plausible, so that it would be a su-
perficial conclusion to link them directly to real cortical neurons.
However, it has been shown that appropriately trained and con-
strained deep learning architectures can develop neurons during
learning whose tuning properties resemble the ones of neurons
in areas V4 and IT (inferotemporal cortex) (Yamins et al., 2014).
In addition, newmethods for the analysis of the tuning properties
of neurons on the intermediate layers of such hierarchies have
been developed that might become interesting for the analysis
of neural data (Karpathy et al., 2015; Zeiler and Fergus, 2014).
Finally, some recent work also tries to develop a theoretical un-
derstanding of why hierarchical (deep) architectures have such
favorable generalization properties (Anselmi et al., 2015).
Recently, physiologically inspired example-based recognition
models have also been extended for the recognition of transitive
goal-directed actions, such as the manipulation of objects with
the hand. This requires a modeling of additional computations,
potentially realized parietal areas that analyze the shape and po-
sition of goal objects and the relationship between object and the
effector movements. Onemodel of this type reproduces a variety
of electrophysiological results from action-selective neurons in
the STS and premotor area F5, at the same time accomplishingNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 175
Box 1. Current Status of the Field
d The recognition and understanding of actions of others
that belong to themotor repertoire of the observer involves
an activation of the observer’s motor representations in
addition to a visual analysis of the observed actions.
d The recognition and understanding of others’ actions,
which are not part of the motor repertoire of the observer,
is based on visual analysis of the stimuli and subsequent
inferential processes.
d Mirror representations of others’ action are not limited to
simple hand, mouth, and leg actions but include complex
actions (e.g., climbing) and emotional behaviors (e.g., Ab-
dollahi et al. [2013]).
d Visual processing of actions can be accomplished robustly
by the learning of hierarchies of detectors with appropriate
mechanisms for the encoding of invariance.
d Several computational approaches addressing mecha-
nisms and relevant processes in action recognition and un-
derstanding are available.
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Figure 2B). This model reproduces, for example, the view depen-
dence of action-selective neurons (see ‘‘Some Newly Estab-
lished Properties of Mirror Neurons in Area F5’’), their temporal
sequence selectivity, and predicts a relationship between mirror
neurons and mechanisms for causality perception (Fleischer
et al., 2012). Other models of this type have been tested in
robotics, accomplishing for example the recognition of grip ap-
ertures, affordances, or hand action classification (Prevete
et al., 2008; Tessitore et al., 2010).
Since this class of model was derived, taking into account the
tuning properties of cortical neurons, they make predictions
about the behavior of individual neurons and motivate novel
electrophysiological experiments. The fact that these models
have been successfully tested with real videos provides evi-
dence that they are computationally powerful. A shortcoming
of most models of this type is that they have a pure feed-forward
architecture and largely do not include top-down effects. How-
ever, it has been shown that top-down connections can be
added to such architectures, and under appropriate circum-
stances can improve recognition performance (Layher et al.,
2013). Example-based-vision models do not account for the
well-established interactions between action vision and action
execution (review Schu¨tz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007), since they
do not include motor representations. However, it seems
straightforward to extend these architectures by layers that
represent motor programs (e.g., using neural fields) and to imple-
ment dynamic couplings between neural vison-based and such
motor representations in order to account for mirror properties.
However, presently no electrophysiological data is available
that would allow to constrain the exact form of this coupling.
Conclusions
This paper reviewed recent neurophysiological experiments on
action recognition that define constraints for the development
of future computational and neural theories of action recognition176 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.(see Box 1). Most importantly, the combination of anatomical
and fMRI studies has established homologies between the
action recognition system in humans and monkeys that justify
comparisons between both species. In addition, this work has
delineated the major pathways that are involved in action recog-
nition, including specifically the STS, parietal cortex, and premo-
tor cortex.
Mirror representations with neurons that combine defined vi-
sual and motor-tuning properties have been found specifically
in parietal and premotor cortex, and also to a less degree in other
structures, like the primary motor cortex. What is less clear, and
sets a challenge for future theory-experiment collaborations, is
the characterization of the specific computational roles of these
different regions. This problem is non-trivial because the corre-
spondence between different necessary computational steps
and these neural structures is typically fuzzy, and often neurons
with similar tuning properties are found in different regions. In
addition, electrophysiological studies, trying systematically to
establish the communality and differences between the proper-
ties of action-selective neurons, and especially mirror neurons, in
different areas are largely lacking. Such studies will be essential
to make substantiated assignments between different cortical
areas and computational steps postulated in computational
and neural models.
It is of interest to stress that recent research in neurophysi-
ology shows a shift toward a much more quantitative character-
ization of the underlying representations, for example using
movie stimuli with controlled timing, or specific parametric vari-
ations. Such well-controlled parametric manipulations are an
important step toward the generation of data that can be linked
to detailed quantitative computational and neural models.
In addition, we tried to give an overview of the theoretical
models that are implemented mathematically so that their
behavior can be meaningfully compared with electrophysiolog-
ical experiments. The comparison between physiological data
and existing implemented models reveals several shortcomings
of the existing theoretical frameworks, as well as of the available
experimental approaches. Some of these shortcomings are
listed in Box 2.
Coarsely speaking, the major limitation of the presently avail-
able theories is that they are either only computational, not giving
details about the neural implementation of specific mechanisms,
or they are limited to specific functions in action recognition (e.g.,
accounting only for the visual tuning of relevant neuron popula-
tions). In the field of visual object recognition, meanwhile, very
developed neural theories exist that have been associated with
detailed neural data at multiple levels. The field of action recog-
nition is much less developed in this regard. No physiologically
plausible model that integrates visual and motor representations
by biophysically plausible mechanisms exists. While the number
of hierarchical models for action classification (including deep
architectures) is growing, it is less clear how to link such archi-
tectures to semantic aspects of actions that seem to be impor-
tant for the brain (e.g., the matching between classes of objects
and effector movements, or to different actions subserving the
same goal). Also, no systematic theoretical understanding exists
how to control the learning processes in such architectures. A
further problem is how cortical neural mechanisms for action
Box 2. Future Directions
d We do not have a clear understanding of how computa-
tions are distributed between different cortical areas. (For
example, are there different computational roles of mirror
neurons in parietal, premotor, and motor cortex?)
d How do cortical and subcortical structures interact in ac-
tion recognition?
d A variety of models implements necessary computational
steps by non-biological algorithms. Future work needs to
focus on verifying implementations in terms of physiologi-
cally plausible mechanisms by detailed comparison with
physiological data.
d Some theories make strong assumptions about available
preprocessed inputs, bypassing non-trivial computational
problems. Unless it can be found out how the brain solves
these non-trivial computational problems, these ap-
proaches might not be relevant for the brain.
d Some theories have been implemented only for toy exam-
ples for highly simplified pattern spaces and ignoring con-
straints in terms of computation time. Valid theories need
to scale up to sensory and motor patterns of realistic
complexity and need to result in solutions with realistic
computation times, taking into account the processing
constraints of real neurons.
d Some models cover only partial aspects of action recogni-
tion and understanding, such as purely visual processing.
These approaches have to be extended by working out
possible links to motor and other related brain structures.
d While some of the discussed experimental results, such as
view-tuning, activation of mirror neurons by occluded
stimuli, etc., are captured by some of the existing models,
most of the discussed new experimental results, such as
the modulation of activity by operational distance or ex-
pected reward, are not.
d The existing experimental results often are not appropriate
to distinguish sufficiently between different possible theo-
retical explanations. Experiments have to be designed that
aim at distinguishing different theoretical explanations (for
example message passing vs. activity changes as pre-
dicted by recurrent neural network models).
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ebellum or in the basal ganglia, and what are the computational
advantages of this interaction. These problems set novel theo-
retical challenges, including the questions about how the rele-
vant computations can be implemented neurally.
Bridging the existing gaps between theory and experiments
seems to necessitate new developments in experimental as
well as in theoretical neuroscience. On the theoretical side, the
clarification of the detailed neuro-computational mechanisms
requires the development of theories that are close to real neu-
rons. Purely computational models are not sufficiently constrain-
ing to verify such mechanisms in detail. This obviously makes it
necessary to take into account and understand the mathemat-
ical details of such models. Just using theoretical approaches
as black box and speculating about how they might explaindata will not be sufficient to find out whether they are really im-
plemented by neurons. In addition, models have to be tested
with realistic stimulus sets to verify their computational limits.
Two decades of experience in machine learning and brain-
inspired computing demonstrate that often apparently exciting
algorithms did not scale up for real-world problems, which
makes it unlikely that the brain exploits these algorithms,
since it faces the same computational challenges as technical
applications.
On the side of experimental research, more experiments need
to be developed that test specific computational mechanisms
and operations. Novel methodological approaches, such as
techniques for the simultaneous recordings of large number of
neurons and optogenetic approaches for the causal manipula-
tion of the activity in specific classes of neurons likely likely be
helpful for this purpose. Such techniques might help to clarify
central questions, like how the different types of invariance prop-
erties (e.g., with respect to view, action, actor, or the affordances
of different objects) are jointly encoded in ensembles of action-
selective neurons, and how different areas contribute to these
invariances. Likewise, multi-unit recordings and simultaneous
recordings in multiple relevant areas, and specific cortical layers,
might help to clarify the information flow between layers. This will
help to understand the role of different pathways in the action
processing system (e.g., between the STS and area F5 [Nelissen
et al., 2011]), and it will help to validate specific models, such as
message passing accounts for bottom-up and top-down pro-
cessing.
For the near future, it appears clearly feasible to further char-
acterize the tuning properties of neurons (e.g., with respect to
space, timing, and in terms of parameters characterizing the
object-effector relationship) in the action processing network,
using parametrically highly controlled stimuli generated by
computer graphics. In addition, machine learning techniques
(including classifiers or visualization techniques for neurons at in-
termediate levels of hierarchies) might help to analyze the distrib-
uted representation of relevant parameters in populations of
action-selective neurons. Likewise, it seems possible to test
specific predictions about local computations according to pre-
dictive coding theories in comparison with electrophysiological
data. Another interesting question, which might be addressed
by pharmacological or optogenetic techniques in combination
with theoretical modeling, is how critical different parts of the
cortical action processing network are for different tasks and
how cortical and subcortical structures interact during action
recognition (Caligiore et al., 2013).
In terms of theoretical approaches, it seems feasible to extend
existing hierarchical and deep-learning approaches by inclusion
of layers that represent semantic aspects, such as the relation-
ships between different classes of actions and goal objects. In
addition, the realization of bottom-up and top-down connections
within such hierarchies is important. While predictive coding the-
ory suggests one approach to implement such connections,
there aremany other possibilities, including ones directly derived
from neural data. Such architectures will be suitable for the
modeling of the interaction between action recognition and
attention, and also to capture the observedmodulation of neuron
activity by reward expectations.Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 177
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experiments and the development of new theoretical frame-
works, will ultimately result in a satisfying understanding of the
mechanisms of action processing. Once such a deeper under-
standing for the core problem of action processing is accom-
plished, one might start to explore the interesting question of
whether relevant computational principles also apply to other
cognitive phenomena, as postulated in existing speculative ac-
counts about the relevance of mirror mechanisms for emotion
processing, empathy, or social cognition.
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